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The Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on  
The Financial Leverage- Profitability Relation: Evidence from Vietnam 
Abstract   
This article investigates the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the - 
profitability relation in emerging market firms. Analysing the panel dataset of 295 listed firms 
in Vietnam in the period 2011-2015, this paper finds the evidence for the significant and 
positive effect of board size, board independence and state ownership on the financial leverage - 
profitability relation. The effect CEO duality on the financial leverage - profitability relation 
tends to be negative and the impact CEO ownership inclines to be positive although both of 
them are statistically insignificant. The results are consistent across different estimation 
methods. The study offers insight into how the corporate governance mechanisms alter the 
effect of financial leverage on the firm's performance and how the lack of consideration of the 
corporate governance mechanisms as moderating factors could be the reason for the inconsistent 
findings in the previous studies.  
 
Keywords: Financial leverage, corporate governance, profitability, emerging markets, Vietnam. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the vast amount of literature of financial leverage, there has been no consent to a single 
generalised theory as well as no consistency in empirical findings. Many theories have evolved 
to explain the financial leverage-performance relation. Empirical literature reports different 
results and explains various rationales in this respect; some find positive leverage-performance 
relation while others reveal the adverse effect of debt. The reason behind such contradictory and 
inconsistent results is contingency and situational factors (O'Brien, 2003; Jermias, 2008). 
O’Brien (2003) suggests that literature studying the direct financial leverage-performance 
relationship should include situational and contingency factors in the study to avoid misleading 
conclusions. The magnitude and direction of financial leverage-performance relation can change 
due to moderating factors. Thus, it is critical to consider moderating factors while studying 
financial leverage performance relation.  
 Under a good corporate governance mechanism, the agency problem can be minimised, 
so the use of debt financing may be effective (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Jensen, 1986). In other 
words, corporate governance mechanisms may influence the financial leverage-performance 
relation. However, the possible moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
effectiveness of debt use has received little attention.  
 To bridge this gap, we examine the effects of various corporate governance factors on 
the financial leverage- performance relation of firms in an emerging economy. The rationale for 
focusing on emerging market context is that laws and regulations regarding accounting 
requirements, information disclosure, securities trading are either absent or inefficient, so 
corporate governance instruments that work in developed countries may not operate as intended 
in emerging economies (Young et al.,2008). The agency problem (i.e. interest conflicts between 
shareholders and managers) is arguable to prevalent and hence may affect the effectiveness of 
managerial decision on debt using (Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  
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 We chose Vietnam as an empirical context for this study. This country reveals the 
typical characteristics of an emerging market with rapid economic growth and an immature 
legal system (World Bank, 2018). During the last two decades, Vietnam's capital market has 
significantly developed. From only two companies listed in 2000; now Vietnam's security 
markets have over 700 listed companies of which 23 have a market capitalisation of over USS 1 
billion in 2017 (Vietnamenet, 2017). We use the data of 295 public firms listed in stock markets 
in Vietnam for the period 2011-2015. We employ the two-stage least square instrumental 
variable (2SLS IV) to analyze the data as a baseline model and general moment method (GMM) 
for robustness check.  
 The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. In section 2, we review theories and 
empirical literature to develop hypotheses. A research methodology is presented in section 3 
and findings are reported in section 4. We discuss our research findings in section 5 and 
conclude the paper with our arguments about our contributions to literature and practice in 
section 6.  
   
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1.Financial leverage 
Financial leverage is defined as an extent to which a business relies on borrowed capital 
(Raymar, 1991). The theoretical literature on financial leverage consists of two conflicting 
views on the effect of debt financing. One strand of literature proposes benefits of debt such as 
tax advantages of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), the choice of debt level as a signal of firm 
quality (Ross, 1977), agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and the advantage of 
debt in restricting managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986) and informational role of debt (Harris 
and Raviv, 1990).  
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 In contrast, the other literature strand suggests the negative effect of debt which is 
caused by the financial distress cost (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Kim, 1978).  The debts 
obligate firms to pay periodic interest which limits working capital for the business's operations 
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008). It is also difficult to obtain additional debts in the case of high 
leverage (Le and O'Brien, 2010). As a result, the shortage of working capital could prevent 
firms from grasping some profitable investment opportunities.   
 Empirical research also reports inconsistent findings of the effect of financial leverage 
on firm performance. It is noticeable that most of the research using data of emerging economy 
firms find a negative effect. For instance, the negative effect is reported in Detthamrong et al. 
(2017) which use the data of Thai firms, in Vo and Ellis (2017) which employ Vietnamese 
firms' data, in Kimathi et al. (2015) that use the data of Keynia firms, Salim & Yadav (2012) 
using data of Malaysian listed firms, Le & O'Brien (2010) based on data of Chinese listed firms.  
 O'Brien (2003) and Jermias (2008) explain that inconsistent findings in the existing 
literature exist because of the lack of consideration of situational and contingency factors. Such 
situational and contingency factors potentially moderate the financial leverage- performance 
relation. After O'Brien (2003) and Jermias (2008), later research pays more attention to such 
situational and contingency factors.  Specifically, Vithessonthi & Tongurai (2015a) examine the 
moderating effect of firm international orientation on the financial leverage-performance 
relationship while Vithessonthi & Tongurai (2015b) investigate the moderating effect of firm 
size. It is worth to note that apart from Vithessonthi & Tongurai (2015a,b) that use the context 
of Thailand, research examing the financial leverage-performance using emerging market 
contexts rarely consider situational and contingency factors relationship. Most of the research 
using emerging market context focuses on the direct effects of financial leverage as well as 
several other corporate governance factors on firm performance.  
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 In the context of Vietnam, Vo and Ellis (2017); Cuong (2014) are among few studies 
about the effect of financial leverage on firm performance and none examines the moderating 
effect of corporate governance factors. Different from the previous research on the financial 
leverage-performance link, in this paper, we focus on how various corporate governance 
mechanisms can strengthen or weaken the effect of financial leverage on profitability. 
2.2.Corporate governance  
Corporate governance (CG) is broadly defined by the OECD (2001) as a set of relationships 
between a company’s board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. More specifically, it is a 
system by which a corporation's stakeholders exercise control over corporate management and 
protect the interests of shareholders (John and Senbet, 1998). Dharwadkar et al. (2000) suggest 
board structure (e.g board size, board independence and CEO power also referred as CEO 
duality) and ownership structure (e.g state ownership) as key characteristics of corporate 
governance in emerging markets. Although there is a huge amount of research that includes the 
most recent research using emerging market contexts, examine the direct effect of these 
corporate governance factors on firm performance, no conclusive findings have been reached.   
 For instance, with respect to board independence, its positive effect on firm performance 
can be found in Jackling & Johl (2009) which employs the data of Indian firms, in Liu et al. 
(2015) using the data from China, while the negative effect is reported in Shukeri et a. (2012) 
that use the data from Malaysia, in Darko et al.(2016) which use the data from Ghana. 
Insignificant effect of board independence is reported in Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe (2006) 
and Rashid et al. (2010) that use the data from Bangladesh.  
 A similar situation happens with empirical findings of the effect of board size, some 
studies report its positive effect on financial performance such as Kyereboah-Coleman & 
Biekpe (2006) using the data from Ghana, Shukeri et a.(2012) that use the data of Malaysian 
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firms while others find the negative effect (e.g Mak & Kusnadi, 2005 which employs the data 
from Malaysia and Singapore; Kumar & Singh, 2013 that uses the data from India). 
 In the same circumstance, CEO duality is found to have a positive effect on firm 
performance in Tian and Lau (2001) and Peng et al. (2007) that both use the data of Chinese 
firms as well as Ramdani & Witteloostuijn (2010) that use the data from Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Korea while the negative effect is evidenced in Yan Lam & Kam Lee (2008) using the data 
of Hong Kong firms and in Dogan et al.,(2013) that employs Turkish firms' data. The 
insignificant effect is reported in Shukeri et a. (2012) and Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe 
(2006). 
 Regarding the ownership structure, there is also an extensive body of literature on the 
relationship between ownership structure (e.g CEO ownership, family ownership, state 
ownership) and firm performance but the findings are mixed. Ciftci et al (2019) using the data 
from Turkey reports positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. Jiang et al. 
(2008) and Liao and Young (2012) using the data from China found the positive effect of state 
ownership while the negative is found in some other which also use the data of Chinese firms 
(e.g Lin et al., 2009, Tran et al.,2015) or a U-shape of state ownership on firm performance 
(Tian and Estrin, 2008; Yu,  2013).  
 In brief, the existing literature on corporate governance, despite its insights, has largely 
focused on the direct relationships between corporate governance factors and firm performance. 
Left unanswered is the question: How do the corporate governance factors influence the 
effectiveness of other instruments such as financial leverage and so further influence firm 
performance? In the following part, we will discuss how corporate governance instruments 
moderate the effect of financial leverage on profitability. 
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The moderating effect of board size  
A corporate board (also known as a board of directors) is considered as one of the primary 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (Kumar & Singh, 2013). The corporate board has 
important roles such as design and implementation of strategy, monitoring the performance, and 
activities of the top management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), manage and control the 
management of the company and fostering links between the firm and its external environment 
(Ruigrok et al.,2006). A larger board leads to an increased pool of the knowledge and intellect 
of directors that can be utilized for making profitable decisions (Dalton et al., 1999). The larger 
number of directors on the board also enhances the firm’s ability to form greater external 
linkages (Goodstein et al., 1994) and obtain favourable funding sources and maximize the 
profitability of investment projects. Such benefits brought by a larger number of directors on 
board are particularly important in an emerging market context where formal capital market is 
not well established and functioned and firms are highly reliant on debt financing. Hence, we 
propose that:  
Hypothesis 1. Board size positively moderates the effect of debt financing on the
 profitability of public firms in emerging economies. 
The moderating effect of board independence  
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
1
, the use of IDs can address the 
agency problem by providing oversight of the strategic direction of the firm and scrutinising the 
performance of managers. More IDs on board may provide better overseeing of the firm's 
financial reporting process (Anderson et al., 2004). Beasley (1996) find that the proportion of 
IDs on the board is inversely related to the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Without 
oversight of independent directors, the managers of emerging market firms may foresee an easy 
                                                 
1
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) conceptualises that people are rooted in economic rationality, and thus the ownership 
structure at publicly traded corporations provides incentives for managers (agents) to act in a self-interested and 
opportunistic manner rather than for the benefit of the shareholders (principals). 
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chance to manipulate financial statement and hence incline to borrow and invest in projects 
beneficial to their self-interest rather than to firms (Kochhar, 1996; Le and O'Brien, 2010).  
 With a high presence of IDs, the managers of emerging market firms would be subject to 
high scrutiny and therefore be more rational in making investment decisions from the borrowed 
money. The independently monitoring role of IDs ensures the transparency and effectiveness of 
debt usage (Peng, 2004; Mura, 2007).  
  Moreover, the expertise and external relationships which IDs hold may help managers 
to improve the outcomes of the investments made from borrowed money. Bringing in more 
outside directors may facilitate firms’ borrowing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994). IDs' external 
relations can help the firm obtain favourable loan terms. More capital with a lower cost of 
financing for investment is likely to generate higher profitability. Therefore, the more IDs on 
board are the more likelihood of obtaining favourable conditions for borrowed money and the 
more rational decisions relating to debt use. These benefits are likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of debt using, leading to higher profitability.  As such, we propose that:  
 Hypothesis 2. Board independence positively moderates the effect of debt financing on 
the profitability of public firms in emerging economies. 
The moderating effect of CEO duality  
When the CEO is also a board chair which is referred to in the literature as CEO duality, this 
increases his/her power (Peng, 2004; Mandle et al., 2012). In emerging markets, the regulations 
relating to corporate governance and banking system are still at an early stage of establishment. 
This creates the chance for managers to manipulate the use of debt financing for their benefit at 
the cost of shareholders. The board of directors is the apex of the decision control system.  
Having CEO duality means that CEOs lead this decision control system, so likely harm the 
effectiveness of the control system (Yang & Zhao, 2014). The CEO duality gives CEO more 
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power and freedom in borrowing and using borrowed money in projects which may be not 
profitable for firms but may benefit her/himself. Meanwhile, having a separation of leadership is 
likely to result in better monitoring of CEO's decision associated with debt using, hence more 
effectiveness of debt and higher profitability. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 Hypothesis 3. CEO duality negatively moderates the effect of debt financing on the
 profitability of public firms in emerging economies. 
 
The moderating effect of CEO ownership.  
Some governance features may be motivated by incentive-based models of managerial 
behaviour (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). In emerging markets, the lack of transparent financial 
reporting system may enable managers to take actions that are costly to shareholders. Contracts 
cannot prevent this activity if shareholders are unable to observe managerial behaviour directly 
(Grossman and Hart, 1983). Due to different ability and also not always a transparent system, 
shareholders may not be able to observe fully and directly CEO behaviours in using debt 
financing. CEO ownership may prompt managers to act in a manner that is consistent with the 
interest of shareholders (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). Providing CEOs with ownership incentives 
may encourage them to decide on debt usage in a way that maximises profitability because they 
have direct benefits from the firm's profitability. Thus, we propose:  
 Hypothesis 4. CEO ownership positively moderates the effect of debt financing on the
 profitability of public firms in emerging economies. 
 
The moderating effect of state ownership.  
There has been much debate on the effect of government ownership on the performance of 
emerging market firms (Tran et al.,2015). In emerging markets, state ownership is supposed to 
bring a ‘helping hand’ but state ownership is also argued to bring a ‘grabbing hand’ which 
 
 
11 
 
exploit firm's profit to benefit corrupted politicians as a result of agency problem associated 
with state ownership. In short, state ownership brings both benefit and disadvantage, the net 
effect is likely to be subject to contextual factors. 
 However, our interest is not on the direct effect of state ownership but how state 
ownership influences the effectiveness of debt using. A ‘helping hand’ assumption is 
particularly applicable when an emerging market firm uses debt financing. In an emerging 
market like Vietnam, a government tends to give more support to its state-owned firms, 
particularly in term of giving lost cost loan. A firm with a higher proportion of state ownership 
is argued to obtain more capital subsidy and favourable business condition are provided by the 
government (Tian and Estrin, 2008). State ownership may enhance some investment 
opportunities for the firm (Le and O'Brien, 2010). With a high percentage of state ownership, 
the firm can access to better investment projects, obtain more low-cost loan and consequently 
enhance the profitability of investment projects made with borrowed money. Thus, we propose. 
 Hypothesis 5. State ownership positively moderates the effect of debt financing on the 
profitability of public firms in emerging economies. 
Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual model. Control variables are to be discussed in more details 
in the research method section.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
3. Methodology 
3.1.Empirical model 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we developed an empirical model in which firm accounting 
profitability is a dependent variable; financial leverage, board size, board independence, CEO 
duality, CEO ownership, state ownership and the interaction variables are predictors.  
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 We control for variables associated with the macro-economic environment, industry 
business environment and firm's characteristics. 
 GDP per capita. In general, GDP per capita of a country influences demand in one 
country and so affect the sale and profitability of firm operating in that country. Thus we control 
for GDP per capita. 
 Financial market development. The underdevelopment of legal and financial systems 
prevents firms from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998). Therefore, we control for financial market development. 
  A firm's industry.  The industry is an essential part of the business environment which 
frames organisational competition strategies and practices and hence performance (Porter, 
1980). Thus, we controlled for the industry to capture the industry effect.  
 Firm size. Firm size is a conventional predictor of a firm's performance because large 
firms can have a greater variety of capabilities which may positively influence performance 
(Williamson, 1967). Thus, firm size is included as a control variable in this study.   
 Based on the assumption that profitability of the current year is the outcomes of 
operation in the previous year (Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Bear et al. 2010), we developed the 
baseline model with the one-year lag of the predictors and control variables.    
 Equation 1 presents our baseline model. 
Yi;t = α  + β1 DEi;t−1 +β2Boardsize +  β3 IDi;t−1 + β4 CEODualityi;t−1 + β5CEOowni;t−1 +  β6SOi;t−1 +
β7Interactions i;t−1 + β8 Firmsizei;t−1 + β9 Industryi;t−1 + β10 GDPpercapt−1+ β11 Findept−1   εi:t   (1) 
where for the ith firm at time t; α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient, and 𝜀 is the 
error term. 
𝑌𝑖;𝑡  is the profitability of the ith firm at time t. Following the previous empirical literature (e.g. 
Le and O’Brien, 2010), we used the ratio of Return-on-Assets (ROA) and the ratio of Return-
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on-Equity (ROE) to measure a firm's profitability. We measured the return as the earnings 
before interest and tax as done by Follow Le and O’Brien (2010). We extracted the information 
of a firm's earnings, assets and equity from a firm's financial annual report.  
IDi;t−1  is the percentage of independent directors on board of the ith firm at time t-1 
DEi;t−1 is Debt-to-Equity ratio of the ith firm at time t-1 
FIRMSIZEi;t−1 is the firm’s size of the ith firm at time t-1, measured in terms of total asset 
value, and then normalized by a logarithm (lg.size); 
BOARDSIZEi;t−1 is the board size of the ith firm at time t-1, measured in terms number of 
people on board, and then normalised by a logarithm; 
CEODUALITYi;t−1 is to indicate the situation of CEO duality of the ith firm at time t-1. It is a 
dummy variable (equal to one (1) if the CEO and Chairperson posts are held by the same 
person, otherwise it is zero (0)); 
CEOowni;t−1 is the percentage of shares owned by CEO of the ith firm at time t-1 
SOi;t−1 is a percentage of state ownership of the ith firm at time t-1.  
INDUSTRYi;t−1 is to indicate the industry the ith firm at time t-1. Following Le and O’Brien 
(2010), we measured it by median firm performance for each industry in each year.  
GDPpercapt−1 is GDP per capita of the country at time t-1 
Findept−1 is Financial development index of the country at time t-1 
Interactionsi;t−1 is an interaction variable used to evaluate the moderating effect of the five 
corporate governance factors. The method to calculate the interaction variables is as below. 
 To test the moderating effect, we examine the interaction variable which is the product 
of the moderating variable and moderated variable as suggested in the econometric literature 
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(Baron and Kenny, 1986; Aiken & West, 1991). When the moderating variable and moderated 
variable the moderating variable are continuous variables, we used the mean centred approach 
suggested by Aiken & West (1991) to calculate the interaction variable to eliminate the 
possibility of multicollinearity.  
 Interaction ID*DE= (DE - mean score of DE) * (IDs - mean score of IDs) 
 Interaction Boardsize*DE= (DE- mean score of DE) * (Boardsize - mean score of 
 Boardsize) 
 Interaction CEOduality*DE= (DE - mean score of DE) * CEOduality 
 Interaction CEOown*DE= (DE - mean score of DE) * (CEOown - mean score  of 
 CEOown) 
 Interaction SO*DE= (DE - mean score of DE) * (SO - mean score  of SO) 
3.2. The data and research sample 
Our research sample contains all firms listed on Vietnam’s stock market (Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange and Ha Noi Stock Exchange). For firm-level data, we extracted data from the audited 
financial statements from 2013 to 2017 of all the firms. By 2016, among 700 enterprises listed 
on the stock exchange, we excluded firms in the financial sector (e.g. banks, real estate, 
securities and insurance firms). The reason for this is that financial firms have distinctive 
corporate structures and revenue models, indicated by an extraordinary performance indicator 
(Le and O'Brien, 2010). After excluding the financial firms in the financial sector and firms with 
missing information, the final sample consists of 295 companies. The industries of the sample 
firms are outlined in Table A in the Appendix.  
 For financial development (FINDEP), we collect the data from the International 
Monetary Fund. For GDP per capita, we extract the data from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators. 
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Treatment for reverse causality   
To address the potential reverse causality between profitability and financial leverage by 
explicitly, we use a lag model as presented in Equation (1). Intuitively, this model helps to rule 
out the reverse causality because future events (i.e ROA) cannot cause the current conditions 
(i.e financial leverage). The profitability of the current year cannot be a determinant of the 
financial leverage of the year before. Empirically, we conducted an additional test to rule out the 
reverse causality explicitly. We tested a model with a different lag structure in which financial 
leverage is a dependent variable and lag one year of its predictor variables which are 
profitability and the other control variables used in Equation (1). The unreported model shows 
that current profitability is not a significant predictor of the previous year financial leverage. 
 
Treatments for endogeneity   
Firm growth is arguable to be a potential driver for a debt financing decision. To address the 
potential endogeneity problem of financial leverage associated with firm growth, we used firm 
sale growth of the two year lag as an IV for DE of the one year lag. We also employed firm 
growth as an IV for the interaction variables DE*Boardsize, DE*IDs, DE*CEOduality, 
DE*CEOownership and DE*stateownership. Drawn upon Wooldridge (2010), the two year lag 
firm growth meets two requirements of a good instrumental variable. This is because the two 
year lag firm growth is believed to have a strong effect on predicting variables - the one year lag 
DE (and the five interaction variables made from DE) but weak on the dependent variable- the 
current year profitability (ROA, ROE).   
 Empirically, to check if firm growth is a good IV, we conducted the Durbin (score) chi-
sq test and Wu-Hausman F test of the endogeneity of DE, DE*Boardsize, DE*IDs, 
DE*CEOduality, DE*CEOownership and DE*stateownership when firm growth is in use as an 
IV respectively. The large P-values obtained from these tests show that the hypothesis of 
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exogenous regressor cannot be rejected. Moreover, the results of the Sargan (score) chi2 tests 
and Basmann chi2 tests (p < 0.05) demonstrate that our models have no overidentifying 
restrictions. Thus, the endogeneity issue of DE, DE*Boardsize, DE*IDs, DE*CEOduality, 
DE*CEOownership and DE*stateownership was addressed.  
 
4. Findings 
The descriptive statistics of the dataset and correlation matrix among variables are summarised 
in Table 2. The average total assets (firm size) is VND 1.21 trillion, equivalent to USD 53.30 
million (22,700VND= 1USD). On average, the State has 36 percent stake in privatized firms. 
28.5 percent of firms have a chairman who is also a CEO. The average Debt ratio is 0.181.  The 
average board size is 5.417 people. The average proportion of IDs is 51.5 percent. The average 
Return-on-Asset is 6 percent. The average Return-on-Equity is 6.9 percent. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The testing results obtained from 2 SLS IV estimation method when DE*Boardsize, DE*IDs, 
DE*CEOduality take a turn to be an interaction variable are respectively presented in Table 3. 
The significant and positive effect of DE*Boardsize (β = 0.036, p= 0.049 for ROA and β = 
0.020, p= 0.019 for ROE) indicates the moderating effect of board size on the financial 
leverage-profitability relation is significant and positive. So, Hypothesis 1 is accepted.  
 Regarding the significant and positive effect of DE*IDs (β = 0.029, p= 0.020 for ROA 
and β =0.077, p= 0.034 for ROE), this means that board independence has the significant and 
positive effect on the financial leverage-profitability relation. So, Hypothesis 2 is accepted.  
 Next, the results of an insignificant and negative effect of DE*CEOduality (β =-0.009, 
p=0.112 for ROA; β =-0.077, p= 0.295 for ROE) demonstrate that the effect of CEO duality on 
the financial leverage- profitability relation is insignificant although negative. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
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(Insert Table 3 here) 
 Table 4 shows the testing results obtained from 2 SLS IV when DE*CEOownership and 
DE*stateownership are respectively examined in the regression model. The insignificant and 
positive effect of DE*CEOown (β = 0.053, p=0.113 for ROA; β =0.052, p=0.452 for ROE) 
means that the effect of CEO ownership on the financial leverage- profitability relation is 
insignificant (though positive). Hypothesis 4 is, then, not supported. 
 Finally, the results of a significant and positive effect of DE*SO (β = 0.078, p=0.033 for 
ROA; β = 0.285, p=0.005 for ROE) indicates that the effect of state ownership on the financial 
leverage- profitability relation is significant and positive. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is supported. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
For robustness check, we ran regressions of Equation 1, using GMM estimation method. The 
testing results obtained from GMM and presented in Table 5 and Table 6 show the consistency 
with the results reported in Table 3 and Table 4. This indicates that our results are robust.  
     (Insert Table 5 here) 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
5. Discussion  
Our results show that debt financing tends to harm the profitability of listed firms in Vietnam. 
This finding is in line with other research that uses the data of emerging market firms such as Le 
and O'Brien's (2010) who use the data of Chinese listed firms. More notably, this result is 
consistent with that of Vo and Ellis (2017) who also use the data of Vietnamese firms but in the 
period (2007-2013) earlier than our research period. In a developed economy, debt has both 
costs and benefits which vary in accordance with the firm's strategy (Balakrishnan and Fox, 
1993; Simerly and Li, 2000; O’Brien, 2003). However, in an emerging economy, debt financing 
is associated with high cost. This can be explained through the events occurring in Vietnam 
during the period of this research. During the period 2011-2015, the lending interest rate in 
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Vietnam was averagely 12% (Trading Economics, 2019). This high lending rate leads to high 
debt cost payment and reduces the profitability of public listed firm using high debt financing 
rate. Moreover, the immature law regime in Vietnam is ineffective in protecting the rights of 
debt holders and shareholders. For example, Vietnam's Law on Bankruptcy 2004 provides an 
ambiguous account for determining whether or not a certain company fails into insolvency. 
Those reasons should be clarified as objective (i.e. general economic conditions) or subjective 
(i.e. the company's own faults of investing in unfavourable projects or proposing wrong 
strategies). Consequently, the managers may capture those loopholes to manipulate the business 
operation, particularly the use of debts, and financial data to benefit their interests. Also, 
because it is easy to file a petition to commence bankruptcy procedures and the amount of 
bankrupt value is equally shared among shareholders according to their proportion of 
ownership, the managers may have a tendency to freely make investment decisions by using the 
debt-financed from outside sources. As a result, this negatively affects the performance of 
Vietnamese listed firms.  
 Given the use of debt financing is unavoidable in emerging markets; our findings show 
that corporate governance factors help to reduce the detrimental effect of debt financing on firm 
performance. In particular, our finding shows that a large board size enhances the effectiveness 
of debt using. A large board size brings more experience, skills, and knowledge; diverse 
background of management to deal with various business situations which enable Vietnamese 
firms to have a better financial outcome. This finding indicates the necessity to consider board 
size when studying the financial leverage- performance relation. 
 Our findings also indicate that a high level of board independence significantly reduces 
the negative effect of debt financing. This finding provides empirical evidence for the 
effectiveness of board independence in corporate governance in Vietnam. The previous 
literature on corporate governance in emerging markets provide inconsistent finding on the 
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direct effect of IDs on firm financial performance. This is possible because those studies only 
focused on the direct effect and did not consider the direct effect of board independence on firm 
financial performance through other corporate governance instruments such as capital structure. 
Our finding proves the necessity of board independence in Vietnam, especially when firms use a 
high level of debt financing. Board independence helps to monitor the effectiveness of debt 
usage, therefore, reduces the negative effect of debt financing on firm performance. 
 Our findings of the insignificant effect of CEO duality on the financial leverage-
profitability relation suggest that the more power which CEO has does not cause them to be less 
prudent and inefficient in making debt use decision. Our findings associated with the roles of 
CEO ownership in the financial leverage-profitability relation suggest that ownership-based 
incentives do not enhance the efficiency of CEO debt use decision. These findings indicate that 
neither CEO power nor CEO ownership really matters to the effectiveness of debt use decisions 
of Vietnamese firms. Other corporate governance instruments like board size and board 
independence mentioned above are far more effective in monitoring the effectiveness of debt 
use decisions of Vietnamese firms.   
 Interestingly, our results provide empirical evidence for the positive role of state 
ownership in the financial leverage-profitability relation. This result is contradicted with the 
conventional perception about the role of state ownership. In Vietnam, state ownership has been 
regarded to be associated with inefficiency and agency problem leading to low profitability. Our 
findings support "helping hand" role of state ownership and disapprove the wide perception in 
Vietnam that firms with high state-ownership operate inefficiently and consequently generate 
low income. 
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6.Conclusion  
Analysing the data of 295 public firms listed in stock markets in Vietnam for the period 2011-
2015, we find the evidence for the significant and positive effect of board size, board 
independence and state ownership on the financial leverage - profitability relation. The effect 
CEO duality on the financial leverage - profitability relation is insignificant although it tends to 
be negative while the impact CEO ownership inclines to be positive but it is insignificant. Our 
results are consistent across different estimation methods. 
 Our paper makes some contributions to the literature. First, our paper shows that 
corporate governance mechanisms play useful roles in enhancing the effectiveness of debt use. 
While considerable work in management has examined the governance implications of financial 
leverage and the implications of various corporate governance factors; little research has 
considered corporate governance properties as mechanisms to accelerate the benefits and 
decelerate the adverse effect of debt on firm performance. Second, our study points out that the 
lack of consideration of corporate governance factors could be the reason for the inconsistent 
findings of the financial leverage- firm performance relations. Despite many studies on the 
effect of debt financing on firm performance, the results are inconclusive. O'Brien (2003) and 
Jermias (2008) explain the inconsistent findings in the prior empirical literature results are 
caused by the lack of consideration of situational and contingency factors. These factors need to 
be taken into account when examining the financial leverage- performance relation. Our work 
specifies which corporate governance mechanisms can influence on the financial leverage- 
performance relation. 
 We recommend public firms in emerging economies that when using debt financing, 
they should employ various corporate governance instruments such as using a more people on 
corporate board, using more independent directors to improve the benefits and reduce the cost 
of debt financing. Relying on state ownership may also be helpful to improve the efficiency of 
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debt financing because state ownership may give firm advantages in accessing low-cost loan 
and profitable investment opportunities. We also advise firms that CEO ownership is not an 
effective instrument to promote the efficiency of debt use while CEO duality does not really 
worsen the effectiveness of CEO's debt use decision.  
 We also recommend Vietnam's policymakers to conduct further reform of its capital 
market in order to address the challenges faced in debt financing. According to Vietnam 
National Financial Supervision Committee (2018), Vietnam's financial market reveals following 
major problems: (i) the credit system still plays a leading role in Vietnam's financial system; (ii) 
supplying capital from the banking sector accounts for a major proportion of the total capital 
supply for the economy; (iii) the market for corporate bond does not meet the standards of 
transparency because there is no organization of ratings; (iv) financial products are still 
primitive and lack of diversity; (v) the quality of information provision and transparency in the 
market is still far from the international standards; (iv) the legal framework for market activities 
is not complete. Therefore, to help Vietnamese firms reduce their reliance on debt financing as 
well as the negative effect of debt financing, policymakers should apply measures to address 
those above-mentioned problems, prompting further development of the capital market. More 
specifically, Vietnam's policymakers should strengthen coordination and information sharing 
among financial management and supervision agencies as well as enhance the supervision 
capacity of these agencies. Policymakers should also prioritise to improve risk management 
capacity at commercial banks, in accordance with international standards. By doing this, the 
commercial bank system can enhance efficiency, cutting their operation cost and so able to 
lower their lending interest rate to enterprises. This, in turn, helps firms to lower debt financing 
costs. 
 Our study has some limitations. First, different types of debt may affect firm 
performance in different ways while we did not disintegrate debt in the long term or short term 
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debt. So our conclusion relating to debt in general without distinguishing of short term or long 
term should be interpreted with caution.  Second, it will be more significant if a future study 
conducts empirical tests on several emerging economies rather than focusing on the context of 
one emerging economy as we did in this research. 
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Appendix  
Table A: Industry-based classification of the sample 
Industry  Description  
Observations 
(2011-2015) 
Industry 1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 15 
Industry 2 Mining and quarrying 85 
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Industry 3 Manufacturing 405 
Industry 4 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning supply 115 
Industry 5 Water supply 30 
Industry 6 Construction 425 
Industry 7 Wholesale and retail trade 155 
Industry 8 Transportation and storage 100 
Industry 9 Accommodation and food service activities 35 
Industry 10 Information and communication 40 
Industry 11 Professional, Scientific and technical activities 30 
Industry 12 Administrative and supportive service 15 
Industry 13 Arts, entertainment and recreation 25 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix 
 
ROA ROE DE Bsize ID Duality 
CEO 
own SO 
DE* 
Bsize DE*ID 
DE* 
Dual 
DE* 
CEO 
own DE*SO 
Firsm 
size GDP 
Fin 
Dep VIF 
ROA 1 
               
 
ROE 0.150 1 
              
 
Debtratio -0.010 -0.810 1 
             
1.12 
Boardsize 0.000 0.010 -0.013 1 
            
1.24 
ID 0.011 0.056 0.016 0.108 1 
           
1.12 
CEODuality -0.029 -0.005 0.011 -0.026 -0.249 1 
          
1.46 
CEOown -0.062 -0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.087 0.178 1 
         
1.98 
SO -0.033 -0.006 -0.006 -0.231 -0.010 -0.171 -0.091 1 
        
1.27 
DE*Bsize 0.009 0.810 0.999 -0.002 0.017 0.011 0.002 -0.007 1 
       
1.27 
DE*ID 0.065 0.491 -0.882 0.015 0.038 -0.029 -0.002 0.013 -0.883 1 
      
1.69 
DE*Dual -0.119 -0.038 0.037 -0.033 -0.150 0.482 0.095 -0.026 0.032 -0.014 1 
     
1.36 
DE*CEOown 0.012 -0.809 0.998 -0.011 0.012 0.019 0.049 -0.010 0.997 -0.880 0.044 1 
    
1.77 
DE*SO 0.008 0.760 0.964 -0.010 0.013 0.003 -0.006 0.067 0.971 -0.878 0.022 0.963 1 
   
1.14 
Firmsize 0.065 0.010 0.006 0.262 0.131 0.015 -0.067 0.036 0.008 -0.005 0.016 0.002 0.003 1 
  
1.12 
GDP 0.007 0.010 -0.030 0.037 0.104 -0.044 0.012 -0.016 -0.029 0.052 0.038 -0.030 -0.033 0.025 1 
 
1.06 
FinDep 0.057 0.006 -0.028 0.031 0.039 -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 -0.027 0.036 0.022 -0.031 -0.023 0.009 0.191 1 1.04 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statitic 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ROA 1450 0.060 0.082 -0.489 1.349 
ROE 1450 0.069 0.103 -0.625 2.053 
Debtratio 1450 0.181 0.019 0.000 0.740 
Boardsize 1450 5.417 1.141 0.000 12.000 
ID 1450 0.515 0.178 0.000 1.000 
CEODuality 1450 0.285 0.451 0.000 1.000 
CEOOwnership 1450 0.039 0.046 0.000 0.647 
SO 1450 0.360 0.215 0.000 0.892 
Firmsize 1450  1.210   2.850   0.005   30.100  
GDP 1450 2111.974 160.637 1886.672 2365.622 
FinDep 1450 0.180 0.027 0.150 0.210 
Note: Firm size is measured by total asset in trillion VND; GDP is measured by GDP per capita in USD 
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Table 3: 2SLS IV regression results – The moderating roles of Board Size, Board Composition, and CEO Duality 
  Board Size and Debt Ratio interaction   Board Composition and Debt Ratio interaction   CEO Duality and Debt Ratio interaction 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
  Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
Lag DE -0.010 0.005 
 
-0.161 0.007 
 
-0.003 0.000 
 
-0.057 0.000 
 
-0.003 0.000 
 
-0.054 0.000 
Lag Boardsize 0.026 0.048 
 
0.046 0.042 
 
0.002 0.036 
 
0.017 0.021 
 
0.002 0.045 
 
0.015 0.037 
Lag ID 0.009 0.588 
 
0.201 0.644 
 
0.012 0.043 
 
0.114 0.059 
 
0.015 0.036 
 
-0.259 0.554 
Lag CEODuality 0.011 0.098 
 
0.058 0.745 
 
0.011 0.097 
 
0.059 0.742 
 
-0.027 0.001 
 
-0.193 0.379 
Lag CEOown -0.139 0.024 
 
-0.673 0.690 
 
-0.139 0.023 
 
-0.715 0.342 
 
-0.134 0.029 
 
-0.654 0.699 
Lag SO -0.026 0.012 
 
-0.075 0.043 
 
-0.026 0.055 
 
-0.074 0.844 
 
-0.028 0.040 
 
-0.042 0.910 
Lag Interaction 0.036 0.049 
 
0.020 0.019 
 
0.029 0.020 
 
0.077 0.034 
 
-0.009 0.122 
 
-0.077 0.295 
Lag Firmsize 0.017 0.096 
 
0.018 0.530 
 
0.017 0.096 
 
0.016 0.583 
 
0.019 0.071 
 
0.018 0.536 
Lag Industry 1 0.095 0.098 
 
1.660 0.292 
 
0.100 0.080 
 
1.763 0.262 
 
0.093 0.002 
 
1.787 0.255 
Lag Industry 2 -0.097 0.145 
 
-1.058 0.562 
 
-0.096 0.148 
 
-1.026 0.574 
 
-0.089 0.178 
 
-0.963 0.598 
Lag Industry 3 0.316 0.090 
 
1.440 0.779 
 
0.340 0.070 
 
1.200 0.816 
 
0.415 0.027 
 
2.475 0.633 
Lag Industry 4 0.378 0.021 
 
2.322 0.608 
 
-0.375 0.022 
 
-2.535 0.575 
 
-0.364 0.026 
 
-2.284 0.614 
Lag Industry 5 0.101 0.001 
 
-2.786 0.017 
 
0.096 0.118 
 
-2.749 0.105 
 
0.101 0.098 
 
-2.835 0.094 
Lag Industry 6 0.316 0.263 
 
1.458 0.851 
 
0.306 0.277 
 
1.637 0.833 
 
0.280 0.318 
 
1.123 0.885 
Lag Industry 7 -0.065 0.736 
 
-1.125 0.833 
 
-0.088 0.651 
 
-0.859 0.873 
 
-0.169 0.386 
 
-2.176 0.686 
Lag Industry 8 -0.047 0.025 
 
-0.592 0.019 
 
-0.038 0.059 
 
-0.775 0.095 
 
0.027 0.900 
 
0.052 0.993 
Lag Industry 9 0.025 0.690 
 
3.292 0.060 
 
0.027 0.673 
 
3.290 0.060 
 
0.013 0.831 
 
3.216 0.067 
Lag Industry 10 -0.027 0.951 
 
6.320 0.595 
 
0.017 0.969 
 
7.079 0.551 
 
-0.001 0.999 
 
7.647 0.519 
Lag Industry 11 0.174 0.423 
 
2.150 0.720 
 
0.161 0.460 
 
-2.318 0.699 
 
0.201 0.352 
 
-2.236 0.709 
Lag Industry 12 0.068 0.198 
 
1.293 0.377 
 
0.070 0.190 
 
1.403 0.337 
 
0.059 0.264 
 
1.299 0.375 
Lag Industry 13 0.116 0.317 
 
2.969 0.353 
 
-0.113 0.330 
 
3.010 0.346 
 
-0.133 0.249 
 
2.898 0.365 
Lag GDPpercap 0.048 0.034 
 
0.027 0.069 
 
0.082 0.038 
 
0.040 0.006 
 
0.075 0.038 
 
0.042 0.061 
Lag Findep 0.142 0.241 
 
0.520 0.909 
 
0.129 0.436 
 
0.567 0.901 
 
0.081 0.026 
 
1.259 0.784 
Constant -0.043 0.749 
 
-0.779 0.033 
 
-0.038 0.779 
 
-0.948 0.798 
 
-0.022 0.868 
 
-1.133 0.759 
R-Squared 0.132     0.113   
 
0.124     0.101   
 
0.109     0.098   
Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
 
0.000     0.000   
 
0.000     0.000   
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Table 4: 2SLS IV regression results – The moderating roles of CEO Ownership and State Ownership 
  CEO Ownership and Debt Ratio interaction   State Ownership and Debt Ratio interaction 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
  Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
Lag DE -0.005 0.000 
 
0.049 0.013 
 
-0.003 0.000 
 
-0.047 0.001 
Lag Boardsize 0.002 0.004 
 
0.016 0.029 
 
0.002 0.030 
 
0.016 0.029 
Lag ID 0.008 0.011 
 
0.210 0.629 
 
0.009 0.079 
 
0.206 0.635 
Lag CEODuality -0.011 0.093 
 
-0.059 0.742 
 
-0.011 0.097 
 
-0.050 0.776 
Lag CEOown 0.231 0.006 
 
0.793 0.733 
 
0.140 0.023 
 
0.678 0.007 
Lag SO -0.025 0.063 
 
-0.062 0.037 
 
-0.027 0.072 
 
-0.546 0.007 
Lag Interaction 0.053 0.113 
 
0.052 0.452 
 
0.078 0.033 
 
0.285 0.005 
Lag Firmsize 0.000 0.091 
 
0.000 0.566 
 
0.000 0.101 
 
0.000 0.578 
Lag Industry 1 0.097 0.090 
 
1.826 0.245 
 
0.098 0.086 
 
1.601 0.307 
Lag Industry 2 -0.093 0.162 
 
-1.019 0.577 
 
-0.096 0.149 
 
-1.159 0.524 
Lag Industry 3 0.319 0.087 
 
1.693 0.742 
 
0.322 0.084 
 
1.177 0.818 
Lag Industry 4 -0.380 0.021 
 
-2.418 0.043 
 
-0.379 0.021 
 
-2.768 0.540 
Lag Industry 5 0.104 0.091 
 
-2.844 0.093 
 
0.099 0.109 
 
-2.486 0.141 
Lag Industry 6 0.315 0.264 
 
1.411 0.856 
 
0.315 0.264 
 
1.343 0.862 
Lag Industry 7 -0.070 0.718 
 
-1.353 0.800 
 
-0.073 0.708 
 
-0.064 0.990 
Lag Industry 8 -0.049 0.818 
 
-0.552 0.925 
 
-0.046 0.829 
 
-0.670 0.908 
Lag Industry 9 0.018 0.773 
 
3.310 0.060 
 
0.027 0.676 
 
3.030 0.083 
Lag Industry 10 0.019 0.965 
 
7.642 0.519 
 
0.002 0.997 
 
5.647 0.633 
Lag Industry 11 0.168 0.439 
 
-2.513 0.675 
 
0.166 0.447 
 
-1.661 0.781 
Lag Industry 12 0.074 0.165 
 
1.393 0.341 
 
0.071 0.182 
 
1.039 0.478 
Lag Industry 13 -0.110 0.341 
 
3.056 0.339 
 
-0.113 0.329 
 
2.625 0.411 
Lag GDPpercap 0.011 0.052 
 
0.042 0.010 
 
0.080 0.031 
 
0.023 0.049 
Lag Findep 0.127 0.444 
 
0.801 0.861 
 
0.136 0.413 
 
0.114 0.980 
Constant -0.034 0.801 
 
-0.997 0.787 
 
-0.037 0.782 
 
-0.244 0.947 
R-Squared 0.131     0.100   
 
0.127     0.117   
Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
 
0.000     0.000   
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Table 5: GMM One Step Regression Results – The moderating roles of Board Size, Board Composition, and CEO Duality 
  Board Size and Debt Ratio interaction   Board Composition and Debt Ratio interaction   CEO Duality and Debt Ratio interaction 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
  Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
Lag Profitability 0.112 0.145 
 
0.330 0.328 
 
0.081 0.192 
 
-0.140 0.452 
 
0.118 0.169 
 
0.090 0.552 
Lag DE -0.001 0.006 
 
-0.185 0.027 
 
-0.002 0.000 
 
-0.006 0.001 
 
-0.002 0.000 
 
-0.004 0.677 
Lag Boardsize 0.002 0.027 
 
0.041 0.535 
 
0.001 0.816 
 
0.009 0.865 
 
0.002 0.017 
 
0.096 0.052 
Lag ID 0.018 0.073 
 
0.732 0.063 
 
0.024 0.048 
 
0.947 0.002 
 
0.019 0.015 
 
1.060 0.237 
Lag CEODuality -0.025 0.166 
 
-0.175 0.025 
 
-0.023 0.014 
 
-0.286 0.261 
 
-0.005 0.086 
 
-0.132 0.159 
Lag CEOown -0.040 0.698 
 
-1.804 0.341 
 
0.044 0.656 
 
0.819 0.447 
 
0.045 0.033 
 
1.128 0.025 
Lag SO -0.072 0.016 
 
-0.015 0.091 
 
-0.084 0.084 
 
-1.384 0.014 
 
-0.094 0.044 
 
-0.962 0.061 
Lag Interaction 0.046 0.017 
 
0.038 0.025 
 
0.036 0.048 
 
0.176 0.013 
 
-0.005 0.487 
 
-0.180 0.414 
Lag Firmsize 0.026 0.913 
 
-0.024 0.557 
 
0.054 0.819 
 
0.016 0.052 
 
0.010 0.045 
 
-0.014 0.658 
Lag GDPpercap 0.142 0.071 
 
0.490 0.120 
 
0.019 0.021 
 
0.101 0.321 
 
0.212 0.051 
 
0.186 0.125 
Lag Findep 1.394 0.302 
 
10.479 0.664 
 
1.408 0.278 
 
16.955 0.183 
 
1.614 0.223 
 
17.376 0.489 
Lag Industry 1 1.214 0.064 
 
20.139 0.032 
 
1.013 0.087 
 
8.945 0.247 
 
1.086 0.084 
 
19.351 0.135 
Lag Industry 2 -0.161 0.688 
 
12.253 0.308 
 
-0.084 0.830 
 
-8.207 0.098 
 
-0.228 0.553 
 
-13.530 0.175 
Lag Industry 3 1.141 0.085 
 
-2.491 0.769 
 
1.129 0.091 
 
-1.233 0.814 
 
1.132 0.187 
 
-2.009 0.778 
Lag Industry 4 0.043 0.958 
 
9.136 0.732 
 
0.078 0.921 
 
8.677 0.304 
 
0.163 0.844 
 
9.425 0.730 
Lag Industry 5 0.677 0.025 
 
18.273 0.091 
 
0.560 0.353 
 
2.330 0.818 
 
0.732 0.024 
 
16.049 0.304 
Lag Industry 6 0.904 0.308 
 
-2.605 0.817 
 
0.827 0.345 
 
-2.512 0.530 
 
0.898 0.309 
 
-0.965 0.922 
Lag Industry 7 -0.596 0.811 
 
11.363 0.737 
 
-0.747 0.758 
 
11.607 0.672 
 
0.159 0.952 
 
8.855 0.840 
Lag Industry 8 -0.723 0.036 
 
-7.816 0.007 
 
-0.568 0.037 
 
-0.212 0.977 
 
-0.800 0.032 
 
-9.527 0.048 
Lag Industry 9 0.208 0.245 
 
12.856 0.242 
 
0.110 0.515 
 
2.779 0.381 
 
0.281 0.154 
 
13.162 0.364 
Lag Industry 10 0.262 0.687 
 
20.086 0.355 
 
-0.040 0.936 
 
-4.999 0.591 
 
0.234 0.718 
 
13.796 0.512 
Lag Industry 11 0.066 0.878 
 
-5.582 0.433 
 
0.105 0.808 
 
0.274 0.939 
 
0.034 0.939 
 
-2.377 0.609 
Lag Industry 12 -0.124 0.029 
 
-2.248 0.048 
 
-0.103 0.047 
 
-1.786 0.101 
 
-0.086 0.027 
 
-2.116 0.017 
Lag Industry 13 -0.485 0.367 
 
-7.447 0.118 
 
-0.443 0.400 
 
-5.891 0.140 
 
-0.427 0.427 
 
-7.380 0.084 
Constant -0.204 0.135  -1.669 0.246 
 
-0.172 0.193   -1.216 0.327 
 
-0.182 0.167  -3.062 0.221 
AR(1) 0.195 
  
0.223 
  
0.195 
  
0.051 
  
0.203 
  
0.073 
 AR(2) 0.441 
  
0.501 
  
0.512 
  
0.142 
  
0.511 
  
0.335 
 Sargen Test 0.701    0.110   
 
0.915    0.313   
 
0.225    0.101   
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Table 6: GMM One Step Regression Results – The moderating roles of CEO Ownership and State Ownership 
  CEO Ownership and Debt Ratio interaction   State Ownership and Debt Ratio interaction 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
  Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
 
Coef. P value   Coef. P value 
Lag Profitability 0.107 0.155 
 
0.061 0.669 
 
0.108 0.148 
 
0.438 0.413 
Lag DE -0.004 0.062 
 
-0.038 0.039 
 
-0.002 0.000 
 
-0.043 0.426 
Lag Boardsize 0.001 0.015 
 
0.087 0.023 
 
0.002 0.005 
 
0.030 0.081 
Lag ID 0.040 0.006 
 
1.025 0.097 
 
0.009 0.080 
 
0.431 0.053 
Lag CEODuality -0.027 0.126 
 
-0.094 0.086 
 
-0.022 0.217 
 
-0.098 0.717 
Lag CEOown 0.099 0.025 
 
0.043 0.981 
 
0.030 0.044 
 
1.572 0.325 
Lag SO -0.090 0.082 
 
-0.948 0.040 
 
-0.073 0.128 
 
-0.160 0.030 
Lag Interaction 0.503 0.314 
 
0.978 0.182 
 
0.002 0.031 
 
0.376 0.026 
Lag Firmsize 0.063 0.082 
 
0.022 0.058 
 
0.000 0.729 
 
0.000 0.923 
Lag GDPpercap 0.194 0.059 
 
0.277 0.153 
 
0.012 0.434 
 
0.090 0.734 
Lag Findep 1.426 0.296 
 
16.474 0.542 
 
1.502 0.257 
 
14.274 0.545 
Lag Industry 1 1.190 0.062 
 
20.968 0.104 
 
1.086 0.083 
 
14.457 0.269 
Lag Industry 2 -0.171 0.669 
 
-13.600 0.209 
 
-0.179 0.654 
 
-12.671 0.205 
Lag Industry 3 1.141 0.192 
 
-0.884 0.899 
 
1.180 0.166 
 
-1.592 0.828 
Lag Industry 4 0.087 0.918 
 
9.300 0.738 
 
0.155 0.852 
 
17.286 0.558 
Lag Industry 5 0.655 0.280 
 
15.089 0.340 
 
0.669 0.268 
 
15.053 0.178 
Lag Industry 6 0.843 0.043 
 
-1.943 0.847 
 
0.822 0.030 
 
-6.567 0.521 
Lag Industry 7 -0.474 0.854 
 
9.612 0.847 
 
-0.098 0.969 
 
15.496 0.748 
Lag Industry 8 -0.702 0.041 
 
-8.843 0.045 
 
-0.669 0.048 
 
-2.641 0.095 
Lag Industry 9 0.248 0.215 
 
12.937 0.385 
 
0.188 0.308 
 
10.679 0.309 
Lag Industry 10 0.259 0.678 
 
14.356 0.498 
 
0.171 0.759 
 
12.002 0.501 
Lag Industry 11 0.100 0.818 
 
-2.094 0.642 
 
0.023 0.958 
 
-6.343 0.385 
Lag Industry 12 -0.101 0.056 
 
-2.149 0.002 
 
-0.114 0.098 
 
-2.181 0.006 
Lag Industry 13 -0.429 0.420 
 
-7.516 0.076 
 
-0.451 0.397 
 
-6.827 0.020 
Constant -0.239 0.078   -2.912 0.187 
 
-0.152 0.265   -0.454 0.803 
AR(1) 0.197 
  
0.099 
  
0.197 
  
0.105 
 AR(2) 0.267 
  
0.184 
  
0.324 
  
0.229 
 Sargen Test 0.760    0.057   
 
0.810    0.130   
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    Figure 1: Conceptual Model  
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